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Abstract
The (extended) AGM postulates for belief revision seem to deal
with the revision of a given theory K by an arbitrary formula ϕ, but
not to constrain the revisions of two different theories by the same
formula. A new postulate is proposed and compared with other sim-
ilar postulates that have been proposed in the literature. The AGM
revisions that satisfy this new postulate stand in one-to-one corre-
spondence with the rational, consistency-preserving relations. This
correspondence is described explicitly. Two viewpoints on iterative
revisions are distinguished and discussed.
1 Introduction
∗This work was partially supported by the Jean and Helene Alfassa fund for research
in Artificial Intelligence
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1.1 Belief Revision
Belief revision is the study of the way an agent revises or should revise its
beliefs when acquiring new information. A popular framework for this study
has been initiated by Alchouro´n, Makinson and Ga¨rdenfors in [1, 2, 3], in
which a set of rationality postulates for theory revision were put forward. It
assumes beliefs are sets of formulas closed under logical consequence (i.e., the-
ories) and that new information is a formula. The present work fits squarely
in this framework. An up-to-date description of this very active research area
may be found in [10]. The basic assumptions underlying AGM’s viewpoint
may be summarized as follows.
• The agent holds beliefs: those beliefs constitute some logical theory.
There is no additional structure to the agent’s theory. No beliefs are
stronger than others.
• The agent’s knowledge is changing but the world is not. Keller and
Winslett [15] noticed that updating an agent’s knowledge about a chang-
ing world is a process that is altogether different from theory revision.
Katsuno and Mendelzon [14] proposed different postulates for belief
update.
• When a new piece of information ϕ is presented to an agent that holds
a theory K with which ϕ is inconsistent, the agent will give precedence
to the information ϕ, over the theory K. The theory K is considered as
less important or less reliable than the new information ϕ with which
it conflicts: the agent revises a weakly held theory with a piece of more
reliable information. This policy is obviously not the right one in every
situation, but AGM assume the agent must have some good reason to
prefer ϕ to K. As noticed just above, this reason is not that ϕ describes
some change in a world the previous state of which was described by
K.
• When revising a theory K with some formula ϕ, the agent will try keep
as much as possible of its previously held beliefs: K. In particular, if ϕ
is consistent with K, the agent will keep all of K in its new belief set.
This assumption will be called the maximal retention assumption.
AGM did not describe any specific method to revise theories that would be
the right way of revising under the assumptions above. They thought that
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there is probably no unique best way of revising. Instead, they proposed a
set of rationality postulates they claimed any reasonable method for belief
revision should satisfy. The original postulates were extended in [11]. This
work accepts, under the assumptions above, the extended AGM postulates.
These postulates are meant to express formally the basic assumptions de-
scribed above. These postulates will be presented now and their adequacy
in expressing those basic assumptions will be discussed in section 1.3.
1.2 The AGM postulates
The AGM postulates for belief revision are listed below: Cn denotes logical
consequence and, for an arbitrary theory K (i.e., K is a set of formulas
closed under logical consequence), K∗ϕ denotes the result of revising K by
ϕ. The inconsistent theory, i.e., the full language, is denoted by K⊥. It is
a legal argument for ∗. This paper could have been developed in the more
demanding framework, where the first argument of a revision, K, must be a
consistent theory: the results are essentially the same.
For a justification of these postulates, in addition to the papers cited
above, the reader may also consider [18, 7, 19, 12, 21]. Since the notion of
a revision is considered by philosophers as not being primitive, but derived
from that of theory contraction, the justification of the postulates below is
generally given by justifying corresponding postulates for contractions and
translating back and forth with the help of the Levi and Gardenfo¨rs identi-
ties. Not all specialists are in complete agreement concerning the philosoph-
ical underpinnings of theory revision, the status of the Levi and Gardenfo¨rs
identities, or of the postulates below. The present work does not attack
those deep questions directly, but presents technical results concerning the
postulates that, in turn, help understand what are the processes that the
postulates may reasonably be thought of as modelling and what are those
they do not model satisfactorily. For any theory K and formulas ϕ and ψ:
K∗1 K∗ϕ is a theory.
K∗2 ϕ ∈ K∗ϕ.
K∗3 K∗ϕ ⊆ Cn(K,ϕ).
K∗4 If ¬ϕ 6∈ K, then Cn(K,ϕ) ⊆ K∗ϕ.
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K∗5 If K∗ϕ is inconsistent, then ϕ is a logical contradiction.
K∗6 If |= ϕ↔ ψ, then K∗ϕ = K∗ψ.
K∗7 K∗(ϕ ∧ ψ) ⊆ Cn(K∗ϕ, ψ).
K∗8 If ¬ψ 6∈ K∗ϕ, then Cn(K∗ϕ, ψ) ⊆ K∗(ϕ ∧ ψ)
The reader may notice that, in each of the postulates in which the revision
symbol (∗) appears more than once (K∗6, K∗7 and K∗8), the theory that
appears on the left of the different occurrences of the revision symbol is the
same. We take this as an indication that those postulates do not say much
on the way the revised theory K∗ϕ depends on K. We shall come back to
this point in section 1.3. We shall call a revision K∗ϕ a mild revision, when
¬ϕ 6∈ K and a severe revision, if ¬ϕ ∈ K.
The AGM postulates have been found to be intimately related to rational
consequence relations (see [17]). The translation is precisely described by the
following Theorem.
Theorem 1 If ∗ is a revision operation that satisfies the AGM postulates,
K∗1–K∗8, and K is a theory, the relation ∼K,∗ defined by
α ∼K,∗ β iff β ∈ K∗α (1)
is rational and consistency-preserving.
Proof: We just remind the reader that consistency preservation is the follow-
ing property: if α ∼ false, then α is a logical contradiction. The definition
of all the other properties mentioned in this proof may be found in [16]. Sup-
pose K is a theory and ∗ satisfies the AGM postulates. The consequence
relation ∼K,∗ satisfies Reflexivity by K∗2, Left Logical Equivalence by K∗6,
Right Weakening and And by K∗1, Conditionalization (i.e., (S)) by K∗7,
and Rational Monotonicity by K∗8. It is consistency-preserving by K∗5.
Any such relation is rational.
Notice that postulates K∗3 and K∗4 are not used in the proof of Theorem 1.
This point will be discussed after we have proved Theorem 2.
One may expect the converse to Theorem 1 to hold: if ∼ is an arbitrary,
rational and consistency-preserving relation, then, there is a theory K and
a revision ∗ satisfying K∗1–K∗8 such that α ∼β iff β ∈ K∗α. This result
holds. It is not difficult to present a direct proof at this stage. An indirect
proof will be preferred and presented in Theorem 4.
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1.3 Critique of the AGM postulates
The AGM postulates have been discussed in the literature, in particular
in [13], [14] and [6]. Some authors reject some of the postulates, in particular
K∗8, the same and others propose to extend the AGM postulates by addi-
tional postulates. The main line of critique of the AGM postulates seems to
be that they do not constrain the revisions enough: some revisions allowed by
the postulates do not seem reasonable. There are three points, in particular,
on which it seems that the postulates do not say enough, or, more precisely,
one could feel that additional acceptable postulates may be proposed.
• The postulates do not seem to enforce the principle of maximal reten-
tion when the formula ϕ is inconsistent with the theory K.
• They do not seem to impose enough constraints on the revision of two
different theories by the same formula, or by related formulas.
• They do not seem to enforce enough constraints on iterated revisions,
e.g., concerning the relation between K, ϕ, ψ and (K∗ϕ)∗ψ.
The proposals to drop some of the AGM postulates seem to stem from the
desire to add some other postulates with which they are inconsistent, more
than from a direct critique of the postulates in question. The first point
raised above has been the reason for the interest in maxichoice contractions
manifested by AGM, but no suitable additional postulate has been proposed
to deal with it. The second point has been very aptly discussed in [17]. The
authors write: “Revision is an operation of two arguments, forming A∗x out
of theory A and proposition x. On the other hand, nonmonotonic inference
conceived as an operation C(x) defined as {y | x ∼ y} is a function of only
one argument x. For this reason the logic of theory change is potentially
more general than the logic of nonmonotonic inference, in that it allows the
possibility of variation in the other argument A. Potentially, because this
possibility has hardly been explored. The postulates for revision presented
in [9] all concern the case where the theory A is held constant”. We shall
show, in the sequel, that the third point is intimately related to the second
one. This paper will present an additional postulate constraining the way
one may revise different theories by the same formula. Its main result is
that this additional postulate precisely reduces the generality of revisions in
a way that makes revision isomorphic to nonmonotonic inference. It will be
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shown that some of the additional postulates proposed in the literature are
incompatible with the AGM axioms and that those that are not, are implied
by our postulate.
1.4 Plan of this paper
In section 2, the additional postulates that were previously proposed in the
literature, by Katsuno and Mendelzon on one hand, and by Darwiche and
Pearl on the other hand, are described and discussed. In section 3 the mini-
mal influence postulate, K∗9, is presented and justified on intuitive grounds.
Some first consequences of K∗9 that concern iterated revisions are then
proven. In section 3.3 and 3.4, its relations with the postulates of sections 2.1
and 2.2, respectively, are analyzed. In section 4.1, we prove the main result
of this paper: revisions that satisfy K∗1 to K∗9 stand in one-to-one corre-
spondence with rational, consistency-preserving relations. In section 4.2 a
conservative extension result, a model-theoretic description of revision, and
the converse to Theorem 1 are proven. We discuss, then, in section 4.3, the
meaning of this result for the ontology of theory revision. Section 5 discusses
the existence of two conflicting views on iterated revisions, concludes and
describes some open questions.
2 Additional postulates previously proposed
2.1 The Katsuno and Mendelzon postulate
In [14], Katsuno and Mendelzon considered the following postulate.
U8 (K ∩K ′)∗ϕ = (K∗ϕ) ∩ (K ′∗ϕ).
Reasonable as it seems, this postulate is nevertheless inconsistent with the
AGM postulates. This is probably the reason why Katsuno and Mendelzon
dropped or weakened some of the AGM postulates in the final version of their
paper. The postulate that will be proposed in this paper is closely related to
U8, therefore we shall analyze it in some detail. Our first remark is that any
revision that satisfies the AGM postulates also satisfies a special case (the
mild case) of U8.
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Proposition 1 If ∗ satisfiesK∗3 andK∗4, then, for any ϕ such that ¬ϕ 6∈ K ∪K ′,
(K ∩K ′)∗ϕ = (K∗ϕ) ∩ (K ′∗ϕ).
The proof is obvious. Our second remark is that U8 may be broken into two
halves.
Proposition 2 The postulate U8 is equivalent to the following two proper-
ties:
U8.1 If K ⊆ K ′, then K∗ϕ ⊆ K ′∗ϕ, and
U8.2 (K∗ϕ) ∩ (K ′∗ϕ) ⊆ (K ∩K ′)∗ϕ.
The proof is obvious. Property U8.1 has been named the postulate of Ad-
dition Monotonicity and considered by Ga¨rdenfors, Makinson and Segerberg
in [8, 22, 20]. Despite its intuitive appeal (shouldn’t the revised theory de-
pend monotonically on the revised theory?), it has been shown to be incon-
sistent with the AGM postulates.
Proposition 3 There is no revision operation that satisfies K∗4, K∗5 and
U8.1.
Proof: Suppose ∗ satisfies K∗4 and U8.1. Let ϕ be an arbitrary formula
that is not a logical contradiction. By U8.1, we have:
Cn(ϕ)∗true ⊆ K⊥∗true.
But, since ϕ is not a logical contradiction, ¬true 6∈ Cn(ϕ) and, by K∗4,
we have Cn(Cn(ϕ), true) ⊆ Cn(ϕ)∗true. We conclude that ϕ ∈ Cn(ϕ)∗true,
and, therefore, ϕ ∈ K⊥∗true. But the set of all formulas that are not a logical
contradiction is inconsistent and K⊥∗true is inconsistent, contradicting K∗5.
It will be shown in section 3.3 that the additional postulate we propose, K∗9,
implies U8.2 and a special case of U8.1.
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2.2 The Darwiche and Pearl postulates
In [6], Darwiche and Pearl proposed four additional postulates. Notice that
K∗ψ∗ϕ means (K∗ψ)∗ϕ.
(C1) If ϕ |= ψ, then K∗ψ∗ϕ = K∗ϕ.
(C2) If ϕ |= ¬ψ, then K∗ψ∗ϕ = K∗ϕ.
(C3) If ψ ∈ K∗ϕ, then ψ ∈ K∗ψ∗ϕ.
(C4) If ¬ψ 6∈ K∗ϕ, then ¬ψ 6∈ K∗ψ∗ϕ.
It will be shown in section 3.4 that the postulates (C1), (C3) and (C4)
are implied by our additional postulate K∗9. The justifications given by
Darwiche and Pearl for those postulates are therefore indirect justifications
for K∗9. The postulate (C2), contrary to the claims of Darwiche and Pearl,
is inconsistent with the AGM axioms.
Proposition 4 There is no revision that satisfies K∗1–K∗4 and (C2).
Proof: Suppose ∗ satisfies K∗1–K∗4 and (C2). Let ϕ be any tautology, say
true and ψ be any logical contradiction, say false. We have true |= ¬false.
The postulate (C2) therefore implies that K∗false∗true = K∗true. But,
for any theory K, K∗false = K⊥ by K∗1 and K∗2. Therefore, for any K,
K∗true = K⊥∗true. But, by K∗3 and K∗4, for any consistent theory K,
K∗true = K. Since K⊥∗true does not depend on K, we conclude that all
consistent theories are equal. A contradiction.
3 The minimal influence postulate
3.1 The postulate
The postulate we propose to add to the AGM postulates is the following.
K∗9 For any theories K,K ′ such that ¬ϕ ∈ K,¬ϕ ∈ K ′ K∗ϕ = K ′∗ϕ.
The postulate K∗9 is obviously equivalent to: if ¬ϕ ∈ K, then K∗ϕ = K⊥∗ϕ.
Its meaning is that, if ¬ϕ is an element of K, i.e., the revision of K by ϕ is
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a severe revision, then the result of revising K by ϕ does not depend on K.
Any revision that satisfies K∗3, K∗4 and K∗9, satisfies:
K∗ϕ =
{
K⊥∗ϕ if ¬ϕ ∈ K
Cn(K,ϕ) otherwise.
(2)
Such a revision is therefore determined by its restriction to K⊥. K∗9 char-
acterizes those revision systems in which the revision K∗ϕ depends mainly
on ϕ and only minimally on K (in the case of a mild revision). Remark also
that, for any revision ∗ that satisfies K∗3 and K∗4, the new postulate K∗9
is equivalent to: K∗ϕ = Cn(K,ϕ)∗ϕ.
The postulate K∗9, at first sight, does not seem to be what one is looking
for. First, it seems in danger of being inconsistent with the AGM postulates.
This concern will be addressed in full in section 4. But, also, one probably
feels that the revisions of K should depend on K in a major way, even
when one considers a severe revision. The feeling that some postulate should
be added is widespread and this paper will present formal arguments as to
why K∗9 is the right postulate to add. Those reasons will not completely
dissipate a first negative reaction to K∗9. The source of this clash between
formal arguments and intuitive reaction probably lies in the philosophical
underpinnings of theory revision and the general framework chosen by AGM
to study theory revision. This paper claims that, in the framework chosen
by AGM, K∗9 is the right postulate to be added. The AGM framework does
not seem to be the one in which to study iterated revisions.
We shall now present direct justification for K∗9. The postulate K∗9 is a
special case of Darwiche and Pearl’s postulate (C2) described in section 2.2,
assuming K∗1 and K∗2. Take, there, ψ to be a logical contradiction. Since
K∗ψ = K⊥, one obtains K∗9. Anybody convinced by their defense of (C2)
will endorseK∗9. Our defense ofK∗9 will be presented now. Notice thatK∗9
is equivalent to the following two properties: they will be justified separately.
K∗9.1 For any theory K such that ¬ϕ ∈ K, K∗ϕ ⊆ K⊥∗ϕ
K∗9.2 For any theory K such that ¬ϕ ∈ K, K⊥∗ϕ ⊆ K∗ϕ
The first, K∗9.1 is relatively easy to justify. It is a special case of U8.1, i.e.,
the postulate of Addition Monotonicity. This postulate has been favorably
considered by many: it is very natural to hope that the more is believed
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before a revision, the more is believed after. None of the many articles cited
above that discuss this postulate rejects it on the grounds its meaning seems
unwanted, and the only problem found with it has been that it is inconsistent
with the AGM postulates. The special case proposed here, K∗9.1, does not
fall prey to this criticism, it is consistent with the AGM postulates, and
should be adopted.
The second, K∗9.2, is more difficult to justify. A formally weaker postu-
late, K∗9.2′, will be presented and justified in a direct way. It will then been
shown that, in the presence of other AGM postulates, it implies K∗9.2. The
consideration of a similar property was suggested by Isaac Levi.
K∗9.2′ If ψ ∈ K and ψ ∈ K⊥∗ϕ, then ψ ∈ K∗ϕ.
Our justification for K∗9.2′ is the following. If ψ ∈ K, then the principle of
maximal retention implies we should try to keep ψ in K∗ϕ. If ψ ∈ K⊥∗ϕ, we
know that ψ may be kept in K∗ϕ (in particular ψ does not contradict ϕ),
K∗9.2′ says that, in this case, we should have ψ in K∗ϕ. It is easy to see
that K∗9.2 implies K∗9.2′, in the presence of K∗4. It will now be shown that
K∗9.2′ implies K∗9.2.
Proposition 5 Any revision ∗ that satisfies K∗1, K∗2 and K∗9.2′ satisfies
K∗9.2.
Proof: Let ∗ satisfyK∗1,K∗2 andK∗9.2′. Suppose ¬ϕ ∈ K, and ψ ∈ K⊥∗ϕ.
We must show that ψ ∈ K∗ϕ. But, ϕ→ ψ ∈ K⊥∗ϕ and ϕ→ ψ ∈ K. By
K∗9.2′, we conclude that ϕ→ ψ ∈ K∗ϕ. By K∗1 and K∗2, then, ψ ∈ L∗ϕ.
The rest of this paper is devoted to proving consequences of K∗9: the
intuitive appeal of those consequences provides indirect justification for it.
In particular, in sections 3.3 and 3.4, it will be shown that K∗9 implies most
of the additional postulates that have been previously proposed in the lit-
erature. All the arguments in favor of those postulates, in particular those
developed in [6] for (C1), (C3) and (C4), provide indirect support for K∗9.
Our representation result, Theorem 2, and the analysis of section 4.3 provide,
both, a soundness result that shows that many revisions satisfy K∗1–K∗9,
and an ontology for those revisions. This provides additional indirect justi-
fication for K∗9.
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It seems that K∗9 contradicts, in a certain degree, the assumption of
maximal retention. If ¬ϕ ∈ K ∩K ′, and ψ ∈ K but ψ 6∈ K ′, then a revision
∗ that satisfies K∗9 will have to let go of ψ when revising K by ϕ or to let
go of ¬ψ when revising K ′ by ϕ. The meaning of this remark is that one
cannot retain maximally always, one must compromise with the assumption
of maximal retention in certain cases to be able to apply it in other cases,
as, e.g., in the justification of K∗9.2′.
3.2 First consequences: iterated revisions
Our understanding of the AGM framework, in which revisions are operations
of two arguments, a theory and a formula, does not require any special men-
tion of iterated revisions: the result of revising K first by ψ and then by ϕ
is the result of revising by ϕ the theory that is the result of revising K by ψ.
Some authors, for example [5], [4] and [24], take a different view and prefer
to treat revisions as operating on a fixed theory and treat iterated revisions
as a special case of varying this theory. This attitude is methodologically at
odds with the AGM point of view, and we shall argue, in section 5.1, that it
tries to answer a different question. Discussion about this approach and its
relations to the present work is postponed to section 5.1.
It is interesting to consider the meaning of our postulate for iterated
revisions. There are two fundamental cases to consider: the case where
revising by ψ and then by ϕ is equivalent to revising by the conjunction
ψ ∧ ϕ, and the case where it is equivalent to revising by the second formula
alone, ϕ. Our result concerning the first case does not use K∗9: if the second
revision is mild then the iterated revision is equivalent to the direct revision
by the conjunction.
Proposition 6 Let ∗ be a revision operation that satisfies K∗1–K∗8. If
¬ϕ 6∈ K∗ψ, then (K∗ψ)∗ϕ = K∗(ψ ∧ ϕ).
Proof: Assume ¬ϕ 6∈ K∗ψ. ByK∗7 andK∗8, Cn(K∗ψ, ϕ) = K∗(ψ ∧ ϕ). By
K∗3 and K∗4, Cn(K∗ψ, ϕ) = (K∗ψ)∗ϕ.
For the second case, we have three different results. First, K∗9 alone implies
that K∗ψ∗ϕ = K∗ϕ if one has ¬ϕ ∈ K∗ψ and ¬ϕ ∈ K. Secondly, we have
the following.
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Proposition 7 Let ∗ be a revision operation that satisfies K∗1–K∗9. If
¬ϕ ∈ K∗(ψ ∨ ϕ), then (K∗ψ)∗ϕ = K∗ϕ.
Proof: Suppose ¬ϕ ∈ K∗(ψ ∨ ϕ). We are going to show that ¬ϕ is an
element of both K∗ψ and K and we shall conclude by K∗9. To show that
¬ϕ ∈ K∗ψ, we consider two cases. First, if ¬ψ 6∈ K∗(ψ ∨ ϕ), by K∗8 and
K∗6, we have
¬ϕ ∈ Cn(K∗(ψ ∨ ϕ), ψ) ⊆ K∗((ψ ∨ ϕ) ∧ ψ) = K∗ψ.
Secondly, if ¬ψ ∈ K∗(ψ ∨ ϕ), since ¬ϕ and ψ∨ϕ are also elements ofK∗(ψ ∨ ϕ)
(by K∗2), we conclude that K∗(ψ ∨ ϕ) is inconsistent. By K∗5, ψ ∨ ϕ is a
logical contradiction and ¬ϕ is a tautology and, by K∗1, an element of K∗ψ.
It is left to us to show that ¬ϕ ∈ K. But, by K∗3,
¬ϕ ∈ K∗(ψ ∨ ϕ) ⊆ Cn(K,ψ ∨ ϕ) ⊆ Cn(K,ϕ).
We conclude that ¬ϕ ∈ K.
The third result of this family is perhaps the most striking. It generalizes
the postulates (C1) and (C3) of Darwiche and Pearl.
Proposition 8 Let ∗ be a revision operation that satisfies K∗1–K∗9. If
ψ ∈ K∗ϕ, then (K∗ψ)∗ϕ = K∗ϕ.
The meaning of Proposition 8 is very natural: if revising K by ϕ would
convince the agent that ψ is true, then revising K, first by ψ, and then by
ϕ amounts to revising, first by ψ, and then by some information, ϕ, that
conditionally implies the first information. This boils down to revising first
by some partial information and then by the full information. This is indeed
expected to be equivalent to revising directly by the full information.
Proof: Suppose ψ ∈ K∗ϕ. Two cases will be considered. Suppose, first,
that ¬ϕ 6∈ K∗ψ. By Proposition 6, (K∗ψ)∗ϕ = K∗(ψ ∧ ϕ). But ψ ∈ K∗ϕ,
and, by Theorem 1 and the properties of rational relations, ϕ ∼K,∗ ψ implies
that, for any χ, ϕ ∼K,∗ χ iff ϕ ∧ ψ ∼K,∗ χ. Therefore K∗ϕ = K∗(ϕ ∧ ψ). We
conclude that (K∗ψ)∗ϕ = K∗ϕ.
Suppose, now, that ¬ϕ ∈ K∗ψ. ByK∗3, ¬ϕ ∈ Cn(K,ψ) and ψ → ¬ϕ ∈ K.
But ψ ∈ K∗ϕ, and, similarly, ϕ→ ψ ∈ K. We conclude that ¬ϕ ∈ K. By
K∗9, then, (K∗ψ)∗ϕ = K∗ϕ.
In the next sections, we shall examine in detail the relation between K∗9 and
the postulates previously proposed by, both, Katsuno and Mendelzon, and
Darwiche and Pearl.
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3.3 K∗9 and U8
Our first result is that any revision that satisfies K∗9 satisfies a special case
of U8.
Proposition 9 Let ∗ be any revision operation that satisfiesK∗9. If ¬ϕ ∈ K ∩K ′,
then (K∗ϕ) ∩ (K ′∗ϕ) = (K ∩K ′)∗ϕ.
The proof is obvious. Our second result deals with U8.2.
Proposition 10 Any revision operation ∗ that satisfies K∗3, K∗4 and K∗9
satisfies U8.2.
Proof: For any revision ∗ that satisfies the assumptions, we must show that
(K∗ϕ) ∩ (K ′∗ϕ) ⊆ (K ∩K ′)∗ϕ. Suppose, first, that ¬ϕ 6∈ K ∩K ′. By K∗4,
Cn(K ∩K ′, ϕ) ⊆ (K ∩K ′)∗ϕ. By K∗3,
(K∗ϕ) ∩ (K ′∗ϕ) ⊆ Cn(K,ϕ) ∩ Cn(K ′, ϕ) = Cn(K ∩K ′, ϕ).
Suppose, now, that ¬ϕ ∈ K ∩K ′. We conclude easily by Proposition 9.
Our conclusion is thatK∗9 implies all the cases ofU8 that are consistent with
the AGM postulates, the case that is inconsistent with the AGM postulates
being, as shown in Proposition 3, the case in which ¬ϕ is in K but not
in K ′. In this case the revision of the intersection may be larger than the
intersection of the revisions.
3.4 K∗9 and the Darwiche and Pearl postulates
Let us, now, consider the postulates proposed by Darwiche and Pearl. We
have seen, in Proposition 4, that no revision may satisfy (C2), but the fol-
lowing special case of (C2) is a consequence of K∗9.
Proposition 11 Any revision operation ∗ that satisfies K∗1, K∗2 and K∗9
satisfies:
(C2′) If ¬ϕ ∈ K and ϕ |= ¬ψ, then K∗ψ∗ϕ = K∗ϕ.
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Proof: Suppose ¬ϕ ∈ K and ϕ |= ¬ψ. By K∗9, it is enough to prove that
¬ϕ ∈ K∗ψ, but this is the case since ψ |= ¬ϕ.
We shall now show that the other postulates considered by Darwiche and
Pearl are consequences of K∗9.
Proposition 12 Any revision operation ∗ that satisfies K∗1–K∗9 satisfies
(C1), (C3) and (C4).
Proof: For (C1), suppose ϕ |= ψ. By K∗1 and K∗2, ϕ ∈ K∗ϕ and, by
Propostion 8, we conclude that K∗ψ∗ϕ = K∗ϕ.
For (C3), assume that ψ ∈ K∗ϕ. By Propostion 8, K∗ψ∗ϕ = K∗ϕ. We
conclude that ψ ∈ K∗ψ∗ϕ.
For (C4), assume that ¬ψ 6∈ K∗ϕ. We must show that ¬ψ 6∈ K∗ψ∗ϕ. As-
sume, first, that ¬ϕ 6∈ K∗ψ. In this case, by Proposition 6,K∗ψ∗ϕ = K∗(ϕ ∧ ψ).
But ¬ψ 6∈ K∗ϕ and therefore, by K∗1, ϕ 6|= ¬ψ and ϕ ∧ ψ is not a logical
contradiction. By K∗5, then, K∗(ϕ ∧ ψ) is consistent and ¬ψ 6∈ K∗(ϕ ∧ ψ).
We conclude that ¬ψ 6∈ K∗ψ∗ϕ. Assume, then, that ¬ϕ ∈ K∗ψ. By, K∗3,
ψ → ¬ϕ ∈ K. We shall show that ¬ϕ ∈ K and conclude, by K∗9, that
K∗ψ∗ϕ = K∗ϕ. To show that ¬ϕ ∈ K, it is enough, by K∗4, to show that
K 6⊆ K∗ϕ. We shall show that ψ → ¬ϕ 6∈ K∗ϕ, i.e., ϕ→ ¬ψ 6∈ K∗ϕ. Since
ϕ ∈ K∗ϕ, it is enough to show that ¬ψ 6∈ K∗ϕ, which holds by hypothesis.
As a corollary, we realize that (C1), (C3) and (C4) follow from (C2’).
Corollary 1 Any revision operation ∗ that satisfies K∗1–K∗8 and (C2’),
satisfies (C1), (C3) and (C4).
Proof: We shall show that ∗ satisfies K∗9 and conclude by Proposition 12.
Suppose ¬ϕ ∈ K. Since, ϕ |= ¬false, by (C2’), we have K∗ϕ = K∗false∗ϕ.
But, by K∗1 and K∗2, K∗false = K⊥.
We have brought additional indirect justification for K∗9: it implies all the
postulates proposed by Darwiche an Pearl, except (C2), that has been proved
inconsistent. Some special case of (C2) is also implied by K∗9.
4 Representation of revisions by rational re-
lations
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4.1 Representation result
We shall now prove the main result of this paper: revision operations that
satisfy K∗1–K∗9 may be represented by rational, consistency-preserving re-
lations. There is, even, a bijection between the former and the latter. This
result is an improvement on the results of [17], that described a bijection be-
tween AGM revisions of a fixed theory L and rational, consistency-presrving
relations ∼ such that L = {α | true ∼ α}. This correspondence shows that
the postulate K∗9 is consistent with the AGM postulates: there are revisions
that satisfy K∗1–K∗9, as many as rational, consistency-preserving relations.
Theorem 2 There exists a bijection between the set of revisions that satisfy
the postulates K∗1–K∗9 and the set of consistency-preserving, rational rela-
tions. This map associates to every such revision ∗ the relation ∼∗ defined
by:
ϕ ∼∗ ψ iff ψ ∈ K⊥∗ϕ. (3)
The inverse map associates to any rational, consistency-preserving relation
∼ the revision ∗∼ defined by:
K∗∼ϕ =
{
{ψ | ϕ ∼ ψ} if ¬ϕ ∈ K
Cn(K,ϕ) otherwise.
(4)
Note that the relation ∼∗ defined in (3) is none other than the relation
∼K⊥,∗ defined in Theorem 1. Note also that the revision ∗∼ defined in (4)
from the relation ∼ has a very natural meaning. It says that, in the case
of a mild revision, revise as mandated by K∗3 and K∗4, and in the case
of a severe revision, disregard K (since it is contradicted by the more solid
information ϕ) and replace it by ϕ together with all the formulas that the
agent thinks are usually true when ϕ is.
Proof: Suppose first that ∗ is a revision that satisfies K∗1 to K∗9, and
let us show that the relation ∼∗ defined in (3) is rational and consistency-
preserving. This follows from Theorem 1 applied to K⊥ and ∗, since ∼∗ is
∼K⊥,∗. Note that K∗3, K∗4 and K∗9 are not used in this part of the proof.
Suppose now that ∼ is a consistency-preserving, rational relation and let
us show that the revision ∗∼ defined in (4) satisfies K∗1–K∗9. The cases of
K∗1 (by right weakening and “and”), K∗2 (by reflexivity), K∗3 (if ¬ϕ ∈ K,
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Cn(K,ϕ) = K⊥), K∗4 (by definition), K∗6 (by left logical equivalence), and
K∗9 (by definition) are easily dealt with. Let us show that ∗∼ satisfies
K∗5. Suppose K∗∼ϕ is inconsistent. Then, either ϕ ∼ false or ¬ϕ 6∈ K
and Cn(K,ϕ) is inconsistent. The latter is impossible, therefore ϕ ∼ false
and we conclude by consistency-preservation. For K∗7, we must show that
K∗∼(ϕ ∧ ψ) ⊆ Cn(K∗∼ϕ, ψ). We shall consider two cases. Suppose first
that ¬ϕ ∈ K. Then ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ K too. Suppose χ ∈ K∗∼(ϕ ∧ ψ). Then,
ϕ ∧ ψ ∼ χ. By conditionalization (i.e., rule S), we have ϕ ∼ ψ → χ and,
since ¬ϕ ∈ K, ψ → χ ∈ K∗∼ϕ. Therefore, χ ∈ Cn(K∗∼ϕ, ψ). Suppose now
that ¬ϕ 6∈ K. Then, K∗∼ϕ = Cn(K,ϕ), and Cn(K∗∼ϕ, ψ) = Cn(K,ϕ ∧ ψ).
But we have already shown that ∗∼ satisfies K∗3, therefore
K∗∼(ϕ ∧ ψ) ⊆ Cn(K,ϕ ∧ ψ).
Finally, for K∗8, suppose ¬ψ 6∈ K∗∼ϕ. We have to show that
Cn(K∗∼ϕ, ψ) ⊆ K∗∼(ϕ ∧ ψ),
or, equivalently that if ψ → χ ∈ K∗∼ϕ, then, χ ∈ K∗∼(ϕ ∧ ψ). We consider
again two cases. If, first, ¬ϕ ∈ K, then ϕ ∼ ψ → χ and also ϕ 6∼ ¬ψ, there-
fore, by rational monotonicity, ϕ ∧ ψ ∼ ψ → χ and, by “and” and right weak-
ening, ϕ ∧ ψ ∼ χ. But ¬ϕ ∈ K and therefore ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ K and we conclude
that χ ∈ K∗∼(ϕ ∧ ψ). The second case we must consider is: ¬ϕ 6∈ K. Then
K∗∼ϕ = Cn(K,ϕ) and, by hypothesis, ¬ψ is not a member of this set. This
implies that ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ 6∈ K. Therefore, K∗∼(ϕ ∧ ψ) = Cn(K,ϕ ∧ ψ). There-
fore K∗∼ϕ = Cn(K,ϕ) ⊆ K∗∼(ϕ ∧ ψ).
To complete the proof of the representation theorem, we have to show
that the maps ∼7−→ ∗∼ and ∗ 7−→ ∼∗ are inverse maps, i.e., that ∼∗∼= ∼
and that ∗∼∗ = ∗. For the first equality, we have ϕ ∼∗∼ ψ iff ψ ∈ K⊥∗∼ϕ, iff
ϕ ∼ ψ since ¬ϕ ∈ K⊥. For the second equality, we have
K∗∼∗ϕ =
{
{ψ | ϕ ∼∗ ψ} if ¬ϕ ∈ K
Cn(K,ϕ) otherwise.
Therefore,
K∗∼∗ϕ =
{
K⊥∗ϕ if ¬ϕ ∈ K
Cn(K,ϕ) otherwise.
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But, if ¬ϕ ∈ K, by K∗9, K⊥∗ϕ = K∗ϕ, and if ¬ϕ 6∈ K, by K∗3 and K∗4,
Cn(K,ϕ) = K∗ϕ. Notice that the postulates used now, K∗3, K∗4 and K∗9
are those that were not used in the first part of this proof.
In section 1.2, in the discussion following the proof of Theorem 1, we noticed
that any theory K and any revision operation ∗ that satisfies K∗1, K∗2 and
K∗5 to K∗8 defines a rational, consistency-preserving relation, the relation
∼K,∗ defined in formula (1). We have shown, in Theorem 2, that any such
relation is defined in this way by a specific theory K⊥ and some revision
operation that satisfies not only K∗1, K∗2 and K∗5–K∗8, but also K∗3, K∗4
andK∗9. It does not mean thatK∗3,K∗4 andK∗9 are redundant, i.e., deriv-
able from the other postulates, but only that the mapping (K, ∗) 7−→ ∼K,∗
is not injective. In fact, the reader will quickly realize that no postulate is
redundant, though K∗3 may be weakened to K∗true ⊆ K in the presence
of K∗6 and K∗7. We take this to mean that postulates K∗3, K∗4 and K∗9
say nothing about the nonmonotonic inference aspect of revision: they are
orthogonal to it.
4.2 Consequences of the representation theorem
The first consequence that we shall draw from Theorem 2 is that the postulate
K∗9 does not constrain the ways one may revise a fixed theory K more than
the AGM postulates already did: it only constrains the ways one may revise
different theories by related formulas. If we consider an AGM revision ∗ and
a fixed theory K, there is a revision that satisfies K∗1–K∗9 and that revises
the theory K, for any formula ϕ, exactly as does ∗.
Theorem 3 Let ∗ a revision that satisfies the AGM postulates K∗1 to K∗8.
Then, for any theory K, there exists a revision ∗K that satisfies K∗1–K∗9
and such that, for any ϕ, K∗ϕ = K∗Kϕ.
Proof: Let ∗ a revision that satisfies the AGM postulatesK∗1 toK∗8 and K
an arbitrary theory. By Theorem 1, the relation ∼K,∗, defined in equation (1)
is rational and consistency-preserving. For simplifying notations, we shall
denote ∼K,∗ by ∼. By Theorem 2, the revision ∗∼, defined in equation 3,
satisfies K∗1–K∗9. But, for any ϕ,
K∗∼ϕ =
{
{ψ | ϕ ∼K,∗ ψ} if ¬ϕ ∈ K
Cn(K,ϕ) otherwise.
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Therefore, by equation (1),
K∗∼ϕ =
{
K∗ϕ if ¬ϕ ∈ K
Cn(K,ϕ) otherwise.
But the right hand-side is equal to K∗ϕ.
From the proof above, one sees that the revision ∗K is defined by:
L∗Kϕ =
{
K∗ϕ if ¬ϕ ∈ L
Cn(L, ϕ) otherwise.
(5)
An model-theoretic description of ∗ will be given now. Suppose ∗ satisfies
K∗1–K∗9, and ∼∗ is the rational, consistency-preserving relation associated
to it by equation (3). LetM be any ranked model that defines ∼∗ (see [16]).
Note, that, since ∼∗ is consistency-preserving, every propositional model is
the label in M of some state. For any theory K, let us define MK as the
ranked model obtained from M by creating, below the states of lowest rank
in M , a new level containing a state for each propositional model of K (and
labeled by this model). Note thatM =MK⊥ . It is clear thatMK is a ranked
model. Let ∼MK be the rational relation defined by MK .
Proposition 13 ψ ∈ K∗ϕ iff ϕ ∼MK ψ
Proof: The result follows from equation (2) and the definition of ∼MK .
Note that there is some state at the lowest rank in MK that satisfies ϕ iff
¬ϕ 6∈ K. In this case ϕ ∼MK ψ iff ψ ∈ Cn(K,ϕ).
An important remark, that will be developed in section 5.1, is that, even
though M (and ∼∗) may be recuperated back from MK by leaving out the
states of lowest rank, there is not enough information in ∼MK to determine
∼∗, or ∼ML for L 6= K. Think that one may be build a model M
′
K from
MK by leaving out all the states of MK that satisfy K except the states of
lowest rank. The model M ′K defines the same relation as MK , but no trace
is left in it of the original ranks in M of the states that satisfy K. Our next
consequence of the representation theorem is the converse of Theorem 1.
Theorem 4 Let ∼ be an arbitrary, rational, consistency-preserving relation.
There is a theory K and a revision ∗ that satisfies K∗1–K∗9 such that ϕ ∼ ψ
iff ψ ∈ K∗ϕ.
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Proof: Let ∼ be as above. Take K
def
= {α | true ∼ α}. It is clear that K is
a theory. Take ∗
def
= ∗∼, defined in equation 4. For any ϕ, we have:
K∗ϕ =
{
{ψ | ϕ ∼ ψ} if ¬ϕ ∈ K
Cn(K,ϕ) otherwise.
By the definition of K:
K∗ϕ =
{
{ψ | ϕ ∼ ψ} if true ∼ ¬ϕ
Cn(K,ϕ) otherwise.
But ∼ is rational and: K∗ϕ = {ψ | ϕ ∼ ψ}.
4.3 Revising with a rational, consistency-preserving
relation
The definition of the revision ∗∼ in equation (4) proposes a certain ontology
for theory revision. The agent has a certain rational, consistency-preserving
relation in mind. This relation describes, as far as the agent knows, what
follows from what by default, or in normal circumstances. When it receives
some new information ϕ, the agent revises its current belief set K by either
adding ϕ to its current belief set, if ϕ does not contradict K, or, if it con-
tradicts K, by forgetting about K altogether and adopting ϕ and all default
assumptions that go with ϕ as its new belief set. In the latter situation, the
agent adopts not only ϕ but all its usual, normal consequences also. This
process seems very reasonable: when learning ϕ that contradicts its current
beliefs K, the agent should probably not try to throw away as little of pos-
sible of K to accommodate just ϕ but should throw away enough of K to
accommodate also the most plausible consequences of ϕ. Remember that it
is a basic assumption of the AGM approach that ϕ is more reliable than K,
so we are only saying that the default, i.e. normal, consequences of ϕ should
also be considered more secure than K. If, for example, one’s theory says it
should rain in Paris and in Orle´ans and one learns that there are no clouds
in the sky of Paris, one has a choice between two revisions: conclude that it
does not rain in Paris but rains in Orle´ans, or conclude that it rains neither
in Paris nor in Orle´ans. If one holds the default assumption that when the
sky is cloudless in Paris it does not rain in Orle´ans, the second way of revising
seems more reasonable: it gives precedence to the default “when there are
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no clouds in Paris, it does not rain in Orle´ans” to the proposition “it rains
in Orle´ans” that was in the original theory. Note that this does not contra-
dict the principle of maximal retention, since the original theory contained
both “when there are no clouds in Paris, it does not rain in Orle´ans” and
“it rains in Orle´ans”, and one could not keep both of them in the face of the
information that “there are no clouds in Paris”.
In the process of iterated revisions considered here, the agent revises its
beliefs with new information, using its knowledge of how things generally,
or normally, behave. This knowledge is encoded in a rational, consistency-
preserving relation. The agent does not revise its relation, i.e., its default
knowledge. There is a lot to be said for this analysis: default assumptions are
typically much more stable than beliefs, and so it should be. Consider, for
example, the physicist revising his/her theory about the world in light of the
results of new experiments. The method used in performing this revision,
i.e., deciding what to keep and what to throw away of the old theory, is
a matter of meta-principles, a methodological question, not a question of
physics. There is no reason to think that the result of this new experiment
will change anything in the methodological principles our physicist is using.
Nevertheless, there must also be another process at work: the revision (or
the creation) of default assumptions. After all, those default assumptions,
or these meta-principles come from the observation of evidence. Decision
theory seems to be mainly interested in this process of formation or revision
of default assumptions in the light of new evidence. It operates on a longer
time scale than the revisions considered here and this paper has nothing to
say about it. The revisions we consider are revisions of belief sets performed
under a fixed set of default assumptions.
5 Closing remarks
5.1 Two viewpoints on iterated revisions
We have described and developed what we think is the original AGM view-
point concerning revisions. Revisions have two arguments: a theory to be
revised and a formula by which it is revised. Iterated revisions do not de-
serve any special consideration. Suppose an agent holds ∗ as its revision
procedure. If, at some point in time, it has belief set K and learns ϕ it will,
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then, acquire belief set K∗ϕ. If the agent later learns ψ, it will just use the
same revision ∗ to revise its current belief set K∗ϕ, by the new information
ψ, thus obtaining K∗ϕ∗ψ as its new belief set. In this process, the belief
revision process, ∗, does not change. From this point of view, the revision
process is fixed: theories are revised but the revision method stays fixed. This
is the static viewpoint.
There is a different point of view, that has been illustrated in a number
of recent works on iterated revisions, notably [5], [4] and [24]. This point
of view seems to be rooted in Bayesian decision theory and to draw on [23].
This alternative, dynamic, point of view has attracted most of the attention
recently given to theory revision and can be described as follows. The agent
starts with a belief set K and a method for revising K when some new
information will come along, i.e., the agent knows only how to revise K,
its belief set, it does not know how to revise arbitrary theories. If some
new information comes along, it will revise K with this new information
ϕ, following its method and obtain a new belief set K ′, but it will also
adapt its revision method to be able to revise K ′ when new information will
eventually come along. From this point of view, the new information ϕ does
not only modify the belief set it also modifies the revision method. This
dynamic viewpoint presents a departure from the AGM static framework.
It even seems that those two points of view are incompatible. It will be
shown, first, that a dynamical viewpoint does not provide a static revision
operator, and then, that a static revision operator does not provide a method
for dynamically adapting revisions.
Let us take the dynamical viewpoint.
• In the dynamic view the new revision procedure by which K∗ϕ will be
revised depends on ϕ, whereas, in the static view it should not.
• It must not be the case that all theories may be obtained starting from
K by iterated revisions, whereas the static view insists on being capable
of revising arbitrary theories.
• It must not be the case that the revision of a theory by a formula
is determined by the theory and the formula. It may depend on the
sequence of revisions that led to the theory. In other terms, it may
happen that K is identical with K∗ϕ∗ψ without implying that K∗χ is
identical with K∗ϕ∗ψ∗χ.
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Let us take the static viewpoint, now. The static viewpoint proposes
K∗ψ∗ϕ for the result of revising K, successively, first by ψ and then by ϕ.
The dynamic viewpoint says this iterated revision should be the result of
revising K∗ψ by ϕ, using the revision method obtained by adapting the revi-
sion µ
def
= χ 7−→ K∗χ to the new information ψ. But, in section 4.2, following
Proposition (13), we noticed that µ does not contain enough information to
determine ∗. The mapping ν
def
= ϕ 7−→ K∗ψ∗ϕ is not determined by K∗ψ
and µ alone. The method proposed in this paper for revising with a ratio-
nal, consistency-preserving relation does not yield any method for adapting
revisions, any transmutation in the terms of [24].
5.2 Conclusion and future work
Building on previous work by many researchers, we have completed the anal-
ysis of the relation between the extended AGM postulates for theory revision
and properties of nonmonotonic inference. It was known that one may asso-
ciate rational, consistency-preserving relations to any revision that satisfies
the AGM postulates. We have shown that any such relation is associated
with exactly one revision that satisfies the AGM postulates and an addi-
tional one. The open questions on which further work is needed have to do
with generalizing the results of this paper to larger classes of revisions and
nonmonotonic systems.
One may ask if our results can be generalized to the revisions that satisfy
only the postulates: K∗1–K∗7. Those revisions are known to be intimately
related to preferential relations [21]. Preferential relations may stand in one-
to-one correspondence with the revisions that satisfy K∗1–K∗7 and K∗9.
An orthogonal avenue seems also interesting. We noticed that K∗3 and
K∗4 have no influence on the nonmonotonic aspect of revision. The revisions
that satisfy K∗1, K∗2 and K∗5–K∗8 seem an interesting class to study.
We noticed that, in the AGM framework, the theories to be revised were
unstructured sets of formulas. One would like to put some more structure on
those theories. Such additional structure, on K, should probably constrain
the revisions of the revised theories of the form K∗ϕ. The analogy between
(unstructured) theory revision and nonmonotonic inference should probably
lift to an analogy between generalized theory revision and conditional logic.
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